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Association and Inhibition 
Introduction and Manifesto 
 
What is inhibition? The “problem of inhibition” is one that has puzzled learning 
theorists for many decades. Once it had been demonstrated that pairing a CS (such as 
a tone or a light) with a US (such as food or shock) produced excitatory conditioning 
(Pavlov 1927, and see Chapter 2 of Mackintosh 1974), it was natural to consider if a 
signal could “undo” the effect of an excitatory CS. We now call such a signal a 
Conditioned Inhibitor. A viable recipe for producing conditioned inhibition is to use a 
design such as A+ AB-, which simply denotes trials where A and the US are paired, 
interspersed with trials where A and B occur in compound but without the US. The 
result is that B acquires the properties of being hard to condition to that US (i.e., it 
passes the retardation test for a conditioned inhibitor), and of suppressing excitatory 
responding when presented in compound with A or with another excitatory CS that 
has been conditioned with the same US (i.e., it passes the summation test for 
conditioned inhibition).  In this chapter, we will ask what it is about B that enables it 
to pass these tests, and what it is about the A+ AB- design that confers these 
properties. But first we must consider another use of the term “inhibition”, one that is 
just as prevalent amongst cognitive psychologists, but gives a somewhat different 
meaning to the concept. 
 
Inhibitory control is often invoked in the domain of cognition and action. If one is 
trying to suppress a thought or withhold an inappropriate or irrelevant action, then we 
speak of inhibiting that thought or action as part of the solution to the problem. This 
type of inhibition is considered to be one of the “executive processes” available to us, 
a deliberate top-down act of control enabling us to cope with ever changing 
circumstances (e.g., Baddeley, 1996; Logan, 1985; Miyake et al, 2000). As such, the 
parallel with the research alluded to in the first paragraph, which has often been with 
rats, rabbits or pigeons as subjects, is not particularly obvious. But more recent 
research, e.g. Verbruggen and Logan (2008),  has found that this act of cognitive 
control can, in fact, become associatively mediated. In other words, cues that are 
reliably paired with stopping a response can prime and potentiate that act of control, 
and may even be able to instigate it in their own right. We shall argue that this is 
another form of conditioned inhibition, and one of the questions we wish to explore in 
this chapter is to what extent it shares similarities with the older construct used by 
learning theorists that goes by the same name. 
 
We begin by reviewing some of the basic properties of conditioned inhibition as 
studied in animals, and consider the extent to which these phenomena also apply to 
humans. Our focus then switches to top-down cognitive and motor inhibition and an 
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evaluation of to what extent it can be associatively mediated.  We review the evidence 
for this phenomenon and again seek to establish some of its basic characteristics. We 
end by taking an overtly computational perspective on both sets of phenomena as we 
look for similarities and differences between them. 
 
Basic Phenomena I: Conditioned Inhibition 
 
Conditioning  
If we pair an initially neutral stimulus such as a tone or a light (the CS), with a 
motivationally significant stimulus such as food or shock (the US), then we expect an 
animal exposed to these contingencies to learn that the CS predicts the US (given that 
the stimuli are sufficiently salient, the timing between presentation of the CS and US 
is appropriate etc.). This is demonstrated by means of a change in behaviour of the 
animal. For example, when the light comes on it may run to the magazine where the 
food is delivered, or when the tone sounds it freezes, interrupting its current behaviour 
in preparation for an anticipated shock. These are examples of Pavlovian 
conditioning; and are conventionally explained by positing that an association from 
some representation of the CS to some representation of the US has been set up in the 
animal's mind, such that activation of the CS representation now leads to 
associatively-mediated activation of the US representation, which is sufficient to 
generate the observed change in behaviour. This explanation of learning, as being due 
to the formation of an excitatory link between CS and US representations, is not 
without its problems, but it does capture many of the basic phenomena of Pavlovian 
conditioning, including the observation that responses elicited by a trained CS are 
often similar to that elicited by the US with which it has been paired (cf. Pavlov's 
principle of stimulus substitution). This principle states that the CS becomes a 
substitute for the US, and hence elicits a reaction that is similar in its topography to 
that elicited by presentation of the US itself. 
 
Conditioned Inhibition 
Once a CS (denoted as A) has been established as an excitor for a US by means of A+ 
training (where the + denotes the US), we can use a basic feature-negative design to 
create a conditioned inhibitor. We simply present the animal with trials in which a 
compound of A and another CS, namely B, are presented in the absence of the US 
(AB- trials), whilst still interspersing A+ trials to maintain A as an excitor. B is the 
"negative feature" in this design, because the otherwise expected reinforcement 
(predicted by the presence of A) is not delivered when B occurs. One way of 
expressing this is to say that B has a negative correlation with the US in this design. 
The consequence of this procedure is that responding to the compound of A and B 
diminishes over trials and can completely disappear. As a result we infer that B 
becomes a conditioned inhibitor, able to function as a kind of "safety signal" when the 
US is aversive (e.g., shock). But initially there was considerable debate about the 
status of B, because when presented on its own it is quite possible for it to have no 
detectable effect on behaviour. Indeed, as we shall see, presenting B on its own after 
this type of training procedure can have little effect on the status of B as well. 
 
Tests for Inhibition 
In order to reveal the effects of feature-negative training on B, we conventionally use 
retardation and summation tests (Rescorla, 1969). Taking the latter test first, this 
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involves presenting the conditioned inhibitor, B in compound with a quite different 
CS, C, which is also an excitor for the US. When C is presented on its own it causes 
the conditioned response associated with that combination of CS and US (e.g., 
freezing if we are dealing with tone and shock). But if it is presented in compound 
with B, then this response is diminished, and to a greater extent than if we had simply 
presented C with D, another CS which is equally familiar but has not been trained as a 
conditioned inhibitor (or excitor). Thus, we can see that B is able to have an influence 
over behaviour even in the absence of A, and warrants its status as a conditioned 
inhibitor in its own right. The retardation test takes a somewhat different approach by 
pairing B with the US for which it is a conditioned inhibitor. The result is that B+ 
training proceeds more slowly than D+ training, indicating that some "inhibition" has 
to be overcome to turn B into an excitor. Thus, both the summation and retardation 
tests demonstrate that A+ AB- training has changed the status of B from a neutral CS 




One characteristic of conditioned inhibition is that it typically develops more slowly 
than excitation. Obviously if one has to first establish A as an excitor by means of A+ 
training before we can use AB- to confer inhibitory properties on B then this 
necessarily follows for trivial reasons.  A more interesting demonstration of this point 
can be found by comparing acquisition of this feature-negative design with its feature-
positive counterpart. Thus, if we contrast the A+ AB- design with C- CD+, in the 
former B acquires inhibitory control over the discrimination whereas in the latter D 
develops excitatory control in the feature-positive equivalent. The standard result here 
is that the feature-positive discrimination is acquired more rapidly than the feature-
negative, suggesting that it takes longer to develop B as a conditioned inhibitor than it 
does D as a conditioned excitor (see Lotz, Uengoer, Koenig, Pearce and Lachnit, 
2012). 
 
Another point to note is that it is not necessary to use a full A+ AB- design to make B 
a conditioned inhibitor; a design of the form A+ AB+ will also work, where A is 
followed by a greater magnitude of reinforcement (+) than AB (+). The reduction in 
the reinforcement (or in the probability of reinforcement) is itself enough to confer 
inhibitory properties on B (Cotton, Goodall and Mackintosh, 1982; Harris, Kwok and 
Andrew, 2014). These studies, and others like them, suggest that what is crucial in 
developing conditioned inhibition is that an expectation of one level or rate of 
reinforcement is contradicted by experience, and that this leads to the development of 
something quite different to simple excitatory learning. For example, if we were to 
contrast B in Cotton et al.'s experiment to another stimulus D that had received CD+ 
training in the absence of any prior training to C, then we would not expect D to have 
acquired any inhibitory properties (quite the reverse!). 
 
Extinction 
Perhaps one of the most eye-catching characteristics of conditioned inhibition is that, 
according to Rescorla and Zimmer –Hart (1974), inhibitors do not extinguish. After 
establishing a CS (B) as a conditioned inhibitor, B can be presented on its own for a 
number of extinction trials, B-, without diminishing its capacity to inhibit (i.e. it will 
still pass summation and retardation tests). Even if we extend the extinction procedure 
to a point well beyond that needed to reduce responding to an excitor to floor, the 
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inhibitory properties of B persist, suggesting once again that there is something rather 
different about an inhibitory association when contrasted with an excitatory one 




Mediated Inhibition: The Espinet Effect 
Inhibition can manifest in conventional CS-US designs as well as in what are in effect 
simple sensory preconditioning designs. If we pre-expose two sets of compound 
stimuli (e.g., a solution of sucrose+lemon and another of saline+lemon; AX and BX) 
then a straightforward analysis of the stimulus contingencies leads to the conclusion 
that the saline and the sucrose features of these stimuli should come to inhibit one 
another because of the negative correlation between their presentation:  whenever the 
sucrose (A) occurs, the saline (B) does not, and vice versa (see McLaren, Kaye and 
Mackintosh, 1989; McLaren and Mackintosh, 2000, 2002; and McLaren Forrest and 
Mackintosh, 2012, for a more detailed analysis). More specifically, as a result of 
pairing A and X, X becomes associated with A, and when we now present BX, we 
have a recipe for establishing an inhibitory association from B to A (because B signals 
the absence of A). A similar process will establish inhibitory associations from A to 
B. We can reveal the existence of these mediated inhibitory associations by 
conditioning A (Espinet, Iraola, Bennett and Mackintosh, 1995). After a few A+ trials 
(pairing sucrose with lithium chloride to make the animal feel ill) the animal will 
become averse to drinking A. But when solution B is subsequently tested, then we 
find no aversion relative to controls. Furthermore, B passes the summation and 
retardation tests: it reduces aversion to another CS, C, which has also been paired with 
LiCl, when tested in compound with it (summation test), and is itself harder to 
condition an aversion to than another flavour, D (retardation test). This is the Espinet 
effect, and the most plausible interpretation of these results is that B has the ability to 
depress the activity of A via an inhibitory association with A, and that this then in turn 
expresses itself via the association between A and the US but with the opposite sign to 
normal excitatory activation. Thus, what we have in effect here is an example of 
mediated conditioning, but with the mediation via an inhibitory rather than an 
excitatory association. Later on we will argue that this result and others like it require 
a particular implementation of an inhibitory association that differs from that more 
commonly involved in conditioned inhibition. 
 
The reason we are able to assert this last conclusion is that Bennett, Scahill, Griffiths 
and Mackintosh (1999) have shown that the effect is asymmetric with respect to 
which of A or B is conditioned after alternating exposure to AX and BX. If the 
exposure is such that on each day experience of AX is always followed by BX, but 
then there is no further trial until the next day, our analysis implies that the inhibitory 
B->A association should be strong, but that from A->B should be relatively weak. 
This is because the AX trial leads to a strong X->A association, which allows the 
development of an inhibitory B->A association, but the B->X association will have 
decayed considerably before AX is experienced on the next day reducing learning of 
the inhibitory A->B association. If we now condition A after this pre-exposure to AX 
and BX, we find good evidence that B has acquired inhibitory properties. Our 
explanation of this is that the inhibitory link from B->A can activate a representation 
of A in such a way as to depress the US representation now associated with A. But if 
instead we were to condition B, we would find little evidence of A acquiring 
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inhibitory properties, suggesting that the lack of an inhibitory link from A to B 
prevents the Espinet effect from occurring in this case.  
 
Backward Conditioned Inhibition 
One version of the basic conditioned inhibition procedure can be summarised as A+ | 
AB-. If conditioning A is followed by compound presentations of A with B in the 
absence of the US, B becomes inhibitory. This design can be more fully characterised 
as Forward Conditioned Inhibition. Backward Conditioned Inhibition simply involves 
reversing the ordering of presentation of A+ and AB-, thus AB- | A+. Remarkably, the 
effect is very similar to that obtained with a forward design, namely that B becomes 
inhibitory. This effect was discovered in humans by Chapman (1991) and 
subsequently replicated and further investigated by Le Pelley, Cutler and McLaren 
(2000). It is not susceptible to the same explanation as that offered for the Espinet 
effect as the association between A and B in this case must be excitatory. Thus, an 
explanation in terms of associatively retrieved representations entering into learning 
with the opposite sign to perceptually activated representations (e.g., modified SOP, 
Dickinson and Burke, 1996; negative alpha, Van Hamme and Wasserman, 1994), 
post-acquisition comparison (Miller and Schactman, 1985) or memory-based effects 
as a consequence of retrieval (Le Pelley and McLaren, 2001), must be deployed. We 
do not have space here to discuss these alternative explanations of the phenomenon, 
but simply note that it exists, and that the backward procedure is another effective 
method for producing inhibitory effects. 
 
Inhibition in Humans 
It is worth stating that most of the effects we have considered so far can be 
demonstrated in humans. For Backward Conditioned Inhibition see Le Pelley and 
McLaren, 2001; Le Pelley et al, 2000; and also Graham, Jie, Minn, McLaren and 
Wills, 2011 for demonstrations. Graham (1999) obtained the Espinet effect in humans 
using a medical diagnosis paradigm and demonstrated the asymmetry found by 
Bennet et al (1999). Similarly, Mundy, Dwyer and Honey (2006) were able to 
establish the existence of this asymmetry using procedures that closely paralleled 
those used by Bennet et al (1999) with rats. Thus, these effects seem to be general and 
characteristic of associative learning across species. 
 
What is learned during inhibitory conditioning?  
There are two main accounts of what is learned during inhibitory conditioning. The 
first account states that subjects learn an inhibitory association between the CS and 
the US, which suppresses the US representation (Konorski, 1948). The basic idea here 
is that an inhibitory association is simply a negative excitatory one. This type of 
associative structure (shown in the left panel of Figure 1) emerges naturally from the 
Rescorla-Wagner view of conditioning (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), and from the idea 
that inhibition is the consequence of a disconfirmed expectation of an outcome. In 
essence, the contingencies involved in the A+ AB- training lead to the development of 
the excitatory connection from the representation of A to the US representation, and 
the inhibitory connection from the representation of B to that same US representation. 
Thus, excitation is simply the converse of inhibition and vice versa. The fact that there 
is little evidence for relatively long-distance inhibitory connections at the neural level 
is not an immediate argument invalidating this architecture, as we can imagine the 
inhibitory connection being made up of a long-distance excitatory connection directly 
to an inhibitory neurone that operates at a local level. By "long-distance" connection, 
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we simply mean a connection between different (distant) brain regions; whereas a 
short-distance connection refers to a connection between neurons within the same 
brain region.  
 
The idea of there being a long-distance excitatory connection to some other neurone 
that then expresses this connection via a local inhibitory interneuron leads fairly 
straightforwardly to another possible instantiation of inhibition that depends on the 
existence of mutual antagonism between different centres. This second account posits 
that, instead of implementing some (relatively) direct negative link from the 
representation of the inhibitory CS to the US representation, an excitatory link forms 
from the representation of the inhibitory CS to a "No-US" centre or representation that 
then inhibits the US representation (e.g. Konorski, 1967; Le Pelley, 2004; Pearce and 
Hall, 1980). The key difference between this structure and the earlier one is the use of 
this "No-US" representation making the inhibition in some sense indirect (see the 
right panel of Figure 1), and the No-US representation is susceptible to at least two 
different interpretations. In one (favoured by Konorski) the representation is US 
specific, and so, in the case where A is trained with food pellets, the No-US 
representation would be "No food pellets", but in the case where A is trained with 
sucrose, the No-US representation would be "No sucrose". Another approach to 
implementing the "No-US" account is to first posit that all conditioning is either 
appetitive or aversive, and that there are "centres" corresponding to this that mutually 
inhibit one another (e.g. Dickinson & Dearing, 1979; see also Konorski, 1967). These 
centres can function as the US and No-US centres, with the aversive acting as the No-
US centre for appetitive learning and vice versa. This approach depends more on the 
interaction of two systems that differ in their motivational significance, and as such 
has more general implications for behaviour, as we shall see. It does not require an 
ability to target a No-US representation in a US specific fashion, or that there be a 
distinct No-US representation for each US representation. For this reason, the 
appetitive/aversive centres approach seems to us to be a better complement to the 
more direct implementation of conditioned inhibition shown in the left panel of Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1: Two different associative structures for the implementation of inhibition. 
The panel on the left shows a direct inhibitory connection from the representation of 
the CS to the US representation. The panel on the right shows an indirect inhibitory 








inhibits the US representation via an inhibitory interneurone. 
 
We are now in a position to debate these two alternatives, and start by asserting that 
any account of conditioned inhibition that appeals solely to some interference 
mechanism is not viable in the light of the evidence available from the animal studies 
reviewed in this chapter. We can justify this claim by returning to the demonstration 
by Cotton et al. (1982) showing that conditioned inhibition can be obtained by simply 
reducing the magnitude of the reinforcer delivered when A and B were presented 
together (A+ AB+). A tone (playing the role of A) was accompanied by a 1ma shock, 
and a tone/light compound (AB) was followed by a 0.4 mA shock. The control group 
either had the tone conditioned alone (followed by a 1 mA shock), or the light 
conditioned alone (followed by a 0.4 mA shock). This control group is effectively A+ 
B+. If the apparent inhibition in the experimental group is due to interference caused 
by the light (B) predicting a 0.4 mA shock rather than a 1 mA shock, then B should 
produce a similar effect in the B-alone control group. It did not. Clearly there is 
something special about B in the conditioned inhibition group that stems from the fact 
that it occurs when a larger shock is expected than that delivered. It's worth noting 
that the light alone group (A+ B+) in Cotton et al (1982) would quite probably pass 
the retardation test for inhibition, because we know from Hall and Pearce (1979) that 
if a tone is first paired with a weak shock then this retards subsequent acquisition of a 
tone->strong shock relationship. Thus, Cotton et al. have clearly demonstrated that 
true conditioned inhibition is more than interference. We note that Pearce and Hall 
(1980) favour an alternative explanation of this result couched in terms of changes in 
the associability of a stimulus in any case (see also McLaren and Dickinson, 1990). 
 
Additional evidence on this point can be found in the work of Kremer (1978). He 
showed that compounding a stimulus (B) with stimuli X and Y, which had been 
separately trained to a given US so that the US was still presented to the compound 
BXY, conferred inhibitory properties on B. This result relies on the phenomenon of 
"overexpectation" first demonstrated by Rescorla (1970). If X and Y are both trained 
individually (X+ Y+) and then trained in compound with the same reinforcer (XY+), 
the result is that at test X and Y will both elicit less responding in the animal than 
after the initial training involving the individual stimuli. Thus, a reduction in 
associative strength is deemed to have taken place as a result of the two stimuli 
"overpredicting" the US when offered in compound. Kremer predicted that if BXY+ 
was trained after the X+ Y+ pretraining, then the overexpectation effect should confer 
inhibitory status on the initially neutral B. Kremer observed exactly this. Our point is 
that at no stage in this procedure does the outcome (delivery of the same US) change, 
making any interference account of this phenomenon hard to sustain. This is not to 
say that interference may not play a role in some demonstrations of what is termed 
"inhibition", but we do not believe that it can be the full story. This point will take on 
added significance when we review some of the human data in a later section. 
 
Which brings us back to the question of which of the associative architectures shown 
in Figure 1 is to be preferred? The evidence that tends to favour the direct link shown 
in the left-hand panel of Figure 1 is that involving CS-CS associations, such as the 
Espinet effect. To understand this, it is necessary to realise that the role of A in the 
figure is being played by the common element X (lemon in this case), the role of B by 
saline and the role of the US by sucrose. Thus, a pre-exposure trial involving sucrose 
+ lemon leads to an association between their representations forming as shown 
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between A and the US in the figure. Now a trial following this in which saline + 
lemon is presented will allow the representation of lemon (A) to activate the 
representation of sucrose (US), so that the representation of saline (B) forms an 
inhibitory link to that representation of sucrose (which is not physically present). We 
have already explained why the effect is thought to be mediated via the ability of 
saline, say, to inhibit the representation of sucrose after experience of sucrose + 
lemon/saline + lemon exposure. Clearly, it makes little sense to talk of saline exciting 
an aversive centre when both the sucrose and saline solutions are essentially neutral 
prior to conditioning (the rats have a mild liking for both at the concentrations used). 
We are forced to the conclusion that either the No-US representation has to be very 
specific (i.e. in this case "No-Sucrose"), or an inhibitory link to the sucrose 
representation itself is required. Both structures amount to much the same thing once 
we realise that the "No-Sucrose" structure is effectively an implementation of the 
direct inhibitory link that gets around the need for relatively long-distance pathways 
for inhibition (see above). Hence, we are proposing an excitatory link to some local 
interneuron that then inhibits (locally) the representation of sucrose. Clearly we would 
also need to postulate some resting activation of this sucrose representation in order 
for this inhibition mediated via activation of some representation of saline to be 
effective and to give us the Espinet effect. 
 
The type of evidence that tends to favour the mutually inhibitory appetitive/aversive 
centres structure draws on studies of trans-reinforcer blocking. Dickinson and Dearing 
(1979) were able to show that training B to be an inhibitor for a food US enabled it to 
successfully block learning involving a shock US. That is, once the A+ AB- training 
was completed using the food US, the next phase was CB+ where the + now denotes 
shock. Compared to controls, this group learned less about the association between C 
and shock, suggesting that the prior training of B was, to some extent, blocking 
acquisition for C. A result of this type fits in well with the idea that the "No-US" 
centre could indeed be some general appetitive or aversive motivational 
representation, such that a stimulus that came to predict the absence of food that was 
otherwise expected could itself acquire aversive properties. It is difficult to see how a 
result of this type could be generated with the architecture shown in the left-hand 
panel of Figure 1. For a review of motivational conditioning and interactions between 
the appetitive and aversive system, see Dickinson and Balleine (2002) 
 
Our final position, then, is that there is evidence for i) a general form of inhibition 
mediated via excitatory connections to appetitive/aversive centres that mutually 
inhibit one another and ii) a more specific form of inhibition that is equivalent to a 
direct inhibitory link to the stimulus representation (be it CS or US) in question. The 
first mechanism relates more strongly to the motivationally significant stimuli (USs) 
used in conditioning, the second to structures in what might be termed associative 
memory.  
Basic Phenomena II: Conditioned Inhibitory Control 
 
All our examples of inhibition so far relate to what is called Pavlovian or Classical 
conditioning where associations are formed between representations of events that 
occur in the environment. But this is simply one form of what Dickinson calls event-
event learning (Dickinson, 1980). Now we turn to the issue of inhibition in an 
instrumental context, where the task is to withhold or cancel a thought or action rather 
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than detect the unexpected absence of an event. To do this, we will focus on human 
experiments that investigate the role of inhibition in executive control. Our review of 
this area will conclude that in many cases it is unnecessary to appeal to inhibition to 
explain performance, But there are some circumstances where the case for inhibition 
seems to be strong, and we will focus on these once we have identified them. 
 
In the last few decades, ‘inhibition’ has become a central concept in many theories of 
attentional and executive control. The general tenet is that humans need inhibitory 
mechanisms to suppress irrelevant stimuli, thoughts, actions, and emotions to 
effectively deal with the constant inflow of information and multitude of response 
options. Within the executive control domain, inhibition is not regarded as a unitary 
construct, and several taxonomies have been proposed. Nigg (2000) distinguished 
between (1) cognitive inhibition, which refers to the suppression of irrelevant thoughts 
and information in working memory; (2) interference control, which refers to 
suppression of irrelevant stimuli; (3) behavioural or motor inhibition, which refers to 
the suppression of automatic, prepared, or cued responses; and (4) oculomotor 
inhibition, which refers to the effortful suppression of reflexive saccades. Similar 
taxonomies and distinctions between cognitive and behavioural (or motor) inhibition 
have been proposed by Friedman & Miyake (2004) and Harnishfegher (1995), among 
others. The case for cognitive inhibition is weak (see e.g. MacLeod et al. , 2003; 
Raaijmakers & Jakab, 2013). Therefore we will focus on the inhibition of responses.  
 
Top-down response inhibition in interference tasks 
The role of inhibition in interference control or congruency tasks, such as the Eriksen 
flanker task or the Stroop task, is still disputed. Popular dual-route models (e.g., 
Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990) assume that responses in congruency tasks 
are activated via a direct activation route and an indirect activation route. Activation 
via the direct route is unconditional and automatic, independent of the task 
instructions. By contrast, activation of the response via the indirect route is deliberate 
and controlled. Inhibitory accounts state that conflict or interference is resolved by 
strengthening the processing of relevant information via the indirect route and by 
selectively inhibiting irrelevant information and responses that were activated via the 
direct route (e.g., Ridderinkhof, 2002). Some have argued that inhibition is required to 
suppress all motor responses globally when conflict between alternative actions is 
detected (Frank, 2006; Wiecki & Frank, 2013). This would effectively allow the 
system to prevent premature responses and to select the appropriate response.  
 
In recent years, evidence both in favour and against inhibitory accounts of 
interference control has been forthcoming. First, several studies have demonstrated 
that top-down inhibition may not be required to resolve interference as this can be 
achieved by top-down enhancement of relevant information alone. Several 
computational models of interference control assume that task demand units or 
representations of the relevant categories will bias processing in the subordinate 
pathways, enhancing the processing of task-relevant information (e.g., Cohen, Dunbar, 
& McClelland, 1990; Herd, Banich, & O'Reilly, 2006). It may be that activation of 
task-relevant information leads to inhibition of competing task-irrelevant processing 
via lateral inhibitory connections. But it is important to stress that this inhibition is 
achieved locally and not via top-down inhibitory connections. Thus, inhibition of 
task-irrelevant information would be a local ‘side-effect’ of top-down excitation of 
task-relevant information. Again, this would help to get around the need for relatively 
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long-distance pathways for inhibition. 
 
But the top-down response-inhibition account has also received support, primarily 
from neuroscience studies (but see also e.g. Ridderinkhof, 2002). For example, a 
recent study tested the response inhibition account using motor-evoked potentials 
(MEPs) elicited by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the right motor cortex 
(Klein, Petitjean, Olivier, Duque, 2014). The authors found reduced MEPs for trials 
on which the distractors were mapped onto a left response. This suggests that 
suppression of motor excitability is a component of interference control (see also e.g., 
van den Wildenberg et al., 2010). It is possible that interference and competition 
caused by irrelevant stimuli is resolved by activating relevant features and stimulus 
processing, whereas response competition is resolved by activating the relevant 
response and selectively suppressing the irrelevant response via separate Go and 
NoGo pathways between prefrontal cortex and the basal ganglia (e.g., Frank, 2005). 
More specifically, the relevant response can be activated via activation of ‘Go’ cells 
in the striatum, which inhibit the internal segment of the globus pallidus (GPi); this 
reduces inhibition of the thalamus, leading to the execution of a motor response (the 
direct cortical-subcortical pathway; Nambu et al, 2002) 1. Irrelevant responses can be 
suppressed via activation of ‘Nogo’ striatal cells, which inhibit the external segment 
of the globus pallidus (GPe); this reduces tonic inhibition between GPe and the GPi, 
resulting in increased activity in GPi, and consequently, increased inhibition of the 
thalamus (the indirect cortical-subcortical pathway; Nambu et al, 2002). Note that 
global suppression of all motor output, as postulated by Frank and colleagues, could 
be achieved via a third pathway, namely the hyperdirect pathway. This involves 
activation of the subthalamic nucleus, which has in turn a broad effect on GPi, leading 
to global suppression of the thalamus. Prefrontal areas, such as the presupplementary 
motor area and the right inferior frontal gyrus, are thought to activate the Nogo cells 
in the striatum or the subthalamic nucleus.  
 
Aftereffects of top-down inhibition: Negative priming 
After a stimulus has appeared as a distractor in congruency tasks such as a picture-
naming task or an Eriksen flanker task, responding to it on the next trial is usually 
impaired. This finding is referred to as ‘negative priming’. The dominant inhibition 
account of negative priming assumes that when an item is a distractor, its 
representation or the process linking the representation with the response becomes 
suppressed, and that residual inhibition impairs responding to the item on the 
following trial (e.g. Tipper, 2001). However, this impairment could be caused by the 
retrieval of stimulus- and response-information from the previous trial (e.g. Neill, 
Valdes, Terry, & Gorfein, 1992; Rothermund, Wentura, & De Houwer, 2005). For 
example, Neill and colleagues proposed that a distractor becomes associated with a 
do-not-respond representation; when it is repeated on the next trial as a target, the do-
not-respond association is activated via associative retrieval, and this will interfere 
with responding. By contrast, Rothermund et al. (2005) suggested that the distractor 
becomes associated with the response to the target on the prime trial; retrieval of this 
response association will interfere with responding on the current probe trial because 
the retrieved information is usually inconsistent with the currently relevant response 
(see Jones, Wills and McLaren, 1998, for an example of how this type of response 
                                                
1 Note that the cortico-basal-ganglia pathways do not directly map on to the direct and 
indirect routes discussed in dual-route frameworks. 
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interference might be implemented). Mayr and Buchner (2007) reviewed the negative 
priming literature, and argued that the available data generally favour the memory 
account over the distractor-inhibition account. 
 
There is a parallel to draw between the memory retrieval accounts of negative priming 
and the conditioned inhibition accounts discussed in Part I. The response-interference 
account of negative priming is akin to the interference account of conditioned 
inhibition that assumes US-US interference. As discussed above, interference between 
CS or US representations may contribute to conditioned inhibition but it seems 
unlikely that it is the only mechanism responsible for the effects we have covered. 
Similarly, Rothermund et al., (2005, p.493) noted that ‘stimulus-response retrieval is 
not the only mechanism that produces negative priming, it is one of the underlying 
mechanisms’. One of the other mechanisms could be the establishment of a link 
between the stimulus and a ‘do not respond’ or ‘no response’ representation, similar 
to a ‘no-US’ representation in conditioned inhibition paradigms. This ‘no-response’ 
representation could be specific (e.g. ‘no left response’, akin to a ‘no-A’ 
representation) or more general. Consistent with the latter option, Frings, Moeller and 
Rothermund (2013) have argued that both stimuli and responses may be represented 
by abstract conceptual codes; for example, responses would be coded in terms of 
approach or avoidance. In the context of negative priming, this would imply that 
distractors are linked to a general ‘avoid/aversive’ representation. Indeed, several 
recent studies suggest that conflict is aversive (e.g. Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013; van 
Steenbergen, Band, Hommel, 2009; see also Botvinick, 2007). Furthermore, work by 
Raymond and colleagues suggest that ignoring a distractor could lead to its' 
devaluation (e.g. Raymond, Fenske, & Tavassoli, 2003). Again, this is consistent with 
the idea that stimuli can be linked with general appetitive/approach and 
aversive/avoidance centres, which mutually inhibit each other. Later on, we will argue 
that there is good reason to suppose the existence of both mutually inhibitory 
appetitive/aversive centres and separate approach/avoidance centres, which we will 
refer to as “go” and “stop” centres. 
 
Top-down inhibition of behaviour 
The idea that responses or motor actions can be inhibited in a top-down fashion 
receives the strongest support from paradigms such as the go/no-go paradigm and the 
stop-signal paradigm. Therefore, we will focus on these two paradigms in the 
remainder of this chapter. In the go/no-go paradigm, subjects are presented with a 
series of stimuli and are told to respond when a go stimulus is presented and to 
withhold their response when a no-go stimulus is presented (e.g., press the response 
key for a square but do not press the response key for a diamond; Figure 2, left panel). 
One could argue that the go/no-go task corresponds to an AX+ | BX- design, with A 
and B as the go stimulus and the no-go stimulus, respectively, and X as the task 
context. In the stop-signal paradigm, subjects usually perform a choice reaction task 
on no-signal trials (e.g., press the left response key for a square and press the right 
response key for a diamond; Figure 2, right panel). On a random selection of the trials 
(stop-signal trials), a stop signal (e.g. an auditory tone or a visual cue, such as the 
outline of the go stimulus turning bold) is presented after a variable delay (stop-signal 
delay; SSD), which instructs subjects to withhold the response to the go stimulus on 
those trials. This corresponds to an A+ | AB- design, with A corresponding to the go 




Figure 2: A schematic illustration of the go/no-go and stop-signal paradigms. FIX = 
duration of the fixation interval; MAX RT = maximum response latency; SSD = 
variable stop-signal delay in the stop-signal paradigm.  
 
Behaviourally, performance in both paradigms can be modelled as an independent 
race between a go process, which is triggered by the presentation of a go stimulus, 
and a stop process, which is triggered by the presentation of the no-go stimulus or the 
stop signal (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen, Wagenmakers, 
2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). When the stop process finishes before the go 
process, response inhibition is successful and no response is emitted (signal-inhibit); 
when the go process finishes before the stop process, response inhibition is 
unsuccessful and the response is incorrectly emitted (signal-respond). In the stop-
signal task, the covert latency of the stop process (stop-signal reaction time or SSRT) 
can be estimated from the independent race model (Logan & Cowan, 1984). SSRT 
has proven to be an important measure of the cognitive control processes that are 
involved in stopping. For recent reviews of studies of response inhibition in cognitive 
psychology, cognitive neuroscience, developmental science and psychopathology, see 
e.g. Bari & Robbins (2013b), Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove (2009), and 
Verbruggen & Logan (2008c). 
 
Neurally, response inhibition processes primarily engage a fronto-basal-ganglia 
inhibition network, which includes the right (and possibly left) inferior frontal gyrus, 
the pre-supplementary motor area, the anterior cingulate cortex, the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, parietal regions, and basal ganglia (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 
2014; Bari & Robbins, 2013a; Chambers et al., 2009; Swick, Ashley, & Turken, 
2011)2. On go trials, activation in frontal and parietal areas could lead to activation of 
a go response via the direct fronto-basal ganglia pathway (see above). In the case of 
response inhibition, activation in prefrontal areas could lead to a suppression of motor 
                                                
2 Inhibition of eye movements may recruit a different network. Single-cell studies 
indicate that it relies primarily on the activation of movement- and fixation-related 
neurons in frontal eye fields in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and superior colliculus in 
midbrain (for a review, see Schall & Godlove, 2012). 
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output via the hyperdirect fronto-basal ganglia pathway (see above), resulting in fast 
and global suppression of motor output. This might affect all response tendencies 
including activation in muscles that are irrelevant to the task (Badry et al., 2009; 
Greenhouse, Oldenkamp, & Aron, 2011; Majid, Cai, George, Verbruggen, & Aron, 
2012). More selective inhibition of a specific response could potentially be achieved 
via activation of the indirect fronto-basal pathway (Majid et al., 2012; Smittenaar, 
Guitart-Masip, Lutti, & Dolan, 2013). The exact cognitive role of the frontal regions 
is debated, partly because a detailed processing framework is lacking in many 
neuroscience studies (Verbruggen, McLaren, Chambers, 2014). Moreover, the 
prefrontal areas that are involved in top-down response inhibition are generally 
recruited by tasks that require selection of competing actions (Bunge, 2004; Duncan 
& Owen, 2000) and reprogramming or updating actions (Buch, Mars, Boorman, & 
Rushworth, 2010; Verbruggen, Aron, Stevens, & Chambers, 2010). Thus, response 
selection and response inhibition may be two sides of the same coin (see also 
Mostofsky & Simmonds, 2008), relying on overlapping prefrontal brain areas which 
bias processing in subordinate systems in a context-dependent fashion.  
 
The independent race model of Logan and Cowan (1984) assumes stochastic 
independence between the go and stop processes. However, the cognitive 
neuroscience of stopping indicates that go and stop processes interact to produce 
controlled movements (see also the discussion of the basal ganglia pathways above). 
To address this ‘paradox’, Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, & Schall (2007) proposed an 
interactive model. In their model, the go process is initiated by the go stimulus and a 
go representation is activated after an afferent delay. The stop process is initiated by 
the stop signal and a stop representation is also activated after an afferent delay. Once 
the stop representation is activated, it inhibits go processing strongly and quickly. In 
this interactive model, SSRT primarily reflects the period before the stop unit is 
activated, during which stop and go processing are independent, so its predictions 
correspond to those of the independent model (Logan & Cowan, 1984). 
 
Conditioned inhibitory control? 
Performance in response-inhibition paradigms is usually attributed to a top-down act 
of control (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008; Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 2014). 
However, in recent years, several studies have examined both the short-term and long-
term aftereffects of stopping a response. This work suggests that stop representations 
may be activated via the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations. Eventually, this could 
lead to automaticity of stopping (Logan, 1988; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). In other 
words, inhibitory control may become conditioned.  
 
Several stop-signal studies have observed that response latencies on no-signal trials 
increase after both successful and unsuccessful stopping. This response slowing has 
been attributed to strategic control adjustments: subjects must try to find a balance 
between responding quickly on no-signal trials (speed) and stopping on stop-signal 
trials (caution); this balance would be adjusted in favour of caution after a stop-signal 
trial (Bissett & Logan, 2011). However, the slowing is more pronounced when the 
stimulus or stimulus category of the previous trial is repeated (Bissett & Logan, 2011; 
Enticott, Bradshaw, Bellgrove, Upton, & Ogloff, 2009; Oldenburg, Roger, Assecondi, 
Verbruggen, & Fias, 2012; Rieger & Gauggel, 1999; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a; 
Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2008). This analysis suggests 
some contribution of memory retrieval. Logan (1988) argued that every time people 
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respond to a stimulus, processing episodes are stored as instances in memory. These 
episodes consist of the stimulus (e.g. a shape), the interpretation given to a stimulus 
(e.g. ‘square’), the task goal (‘shape judgment’), and the response (‘left’). When the 
stimulus is repeated, previous processing episodes are retrieved, facilitating 
performance if the retrieved information is consistent with the currently relevant 
information but impairing performance if the retrieved information is inconsistent. On 
a stop-signal trial, the go stimulus or stimulus category becomes associated with 
stopping; when the stimulus (or category) is repeated, the stimulus-stop association is 
retrieved, and this interferes with responding on no-signal trials. The idea here, then, 
is that the go response/goal and the stop response/goal are mutually inhibitory (cf. 
Boucher et al, 2007) in much the way that Dickinson and Dearing (1979) postulate 
appetitive and aversive stimuli are. This stimulus-stop association account is related to 
the ‘do-not-respond tag’ account of the negative priming effect, mentioned earlier 
(Neill & Valdes, 1992; Neill et al., 1992); of course this is no coincidence because 
both accounts are based on the Instance Theory of Logan (1988). The stimulus-stop 
effects are observed up to 20 trials after the presentation of the stop signal 
(Verbruggen and Logan, 2008a). Similar long-term effects have been observed in 
task-switching studies, suggesting that stimuli can become associated with tasks or 
task goals (Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003, 2004, 2005).  
 
Theoretically, repetition priming effects can be viewed as the first step towards 
automatization (Logan, 1990). According to Logan, automatization involves a 
transition from performance based on cognitive algorithms or rules to performance 
based on memory retrieval. Therefore, the observation that a stimulus could prime 
stopping after a signal trial raises the question whether inhibitory control may become 
a bottom-up act of control, driven by retrieval of stimulus-stop associations from 
memory, instead of a top-down act of control. In a series of experiments, we 
examined the bottom-up idea (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b). Initially, we used go/no-
go tasks in which the stimulus category defined whether subjects had to respond (e.g. 
natural objects = go) or not (e.g. man-made objects = no-go). We trained subjects to 
stop their response to a specific stimulus, and then reversed the go/no-go mappings in 
a test phase. In this test phase, subjects were slower to respond to that stimulus 
compared with stimuli that they had not seen before (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b, 
Experiment 1). Furthermore, learning the new go association was slowed, so one 
could argue that it passes a retardation test for inhibition. The response slowing was 
still observed when the tasks changed from training to test: subjects made 
natural/man-made judgements in training but large/small judgments in test (or vice 
versa; Experiment 2), and RTs were longer for inconsistent items (i.e. nogo in one 
task but go in the other task) than for consistent items (i.e. go in both tasks). This last 
is a result akin to that obtained in summation tests for inhibition if training for a given 
stimulus in one category was natural+stimulus=nogo, then on test small+stimulus=go; 
the inhibition derived from training has transferred to the novel test situation in a 
manner analogous to combining an inhibitor with a novel excitor. We also 
demonstrated (Experiment 3) that the effect was not entirely category-driven as 
stimulus-specific slowing was observed when the category-stop mappings were 
inconsistent in training: here the go/no-go mappings changed every block (e.g. 
natural=go and man-made = no-go, vs. natural = no-go, man-made = go), but we used 
different words for each go/no-go rule (resulting in consistent stimulus-stop 
mappings). Based on these findings, we proposed the automatic inhibition hypothesis: 
‘automatic inhibition’ occurs when old no-go stimuli retrieve the stop goal when they 
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are repeated, and this interferes with go processing (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b). 
The stimulus–stop mapping is typically consistent in the go/no-go paradigm, so 
automatic inhibition is likely to occur. However, automatic inhibition can also occur 
in the stop-signal task when the mapping is manipulated (Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008b, Experiment 5).  
 
The experiments of Verbruggen and Logan demonstrated behaviourally that response 
inhibition is not always an effortful or deliberate act of control. A follow-up 
neuroimaging study showed that the right inferior frontal gyrus, which is part of the 
fronto-basal-ganglia network that supports deliberate response inhibition (see above), 
was also activated when stimuli previously associated with stopping were presented in 
a stop-signal task (Lenartowicz, Verbruggen, Logan, & Poldrack, 2011). Thus, at least 
part of the top-down inhibition network was activated in the absence of external stop 
signals. However, the rIFG has been associated with a multitude of roles (e.g. 
attentional reorientation, context monitoring, response selection, reversal learning), 
thus this finding does not necessarily allow strong inferences about the underlying 
cognitive mechanisms. 
 
What is learned during conditioning of inhibitory control?  
What is learned during go/no-go and stop-signal tasks is still unclear. Based on 
Logan’s Instance Theory of Automatization (1988), we hypothesized that stimuli 
became associated with a stop goal or stop representation in training, which impaired 
responding to them at test (Verbruggen et al., 2008; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b). 
Like "No-US" representations (Part I), stop representations can be interpreted in 
different ways. First, the stop representation could be response specific. When a cue 
or stimulus is trained with stopping a left manual response, the stop representation 
would be ‘stop left response’ (or to be even more specific, ‘stop left hand response’); 
but when the stimulus is trained with stopping a right response, the stop representation 
would be ‘stop right response’. Second, the stop representation could be more general. 
Previously we have argued that in stop-signal tasks, a stimulus becomes associated 
with an abstract and general representation of going or stopping; in other words, it 
does not specify which specific response or motor program has to be executed or 
stopped (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). The study of Giesen and Rothermund (2013) 
provides direct support for this general representation idea. These authors 
demonstrated that responding to a stimulus that was previously associated with 
stopping, was delayed even when the expected go response had changed. More 
specifically, the colour of a letter indicated whether subjects had to execute a left or 
right response; the identity of the letter (‘D’ or ‘L’) was irrelevant. They found that 
responding to a letter was slowed down if a stop signal was presented on the previous 
trial, regardless of the ‘to-be-executed’ or ‘to-be-stopped’ response (e.g. a green D on 
the prime, followed by a red D). This suggests that the stimulus-stop associations are 
general. Note that the ‘general stop representation’ idea is also indirectly supported by 
the observation that stopping often has general effects on the motor system (see 
above).  
 
Recent work on stopping to motivationally salient stimuli suggests a third 
interpretation. Several studies have found that consistent pairing of food-related 
pictures to stopping in a go/no-go or stop-signal-paradigm reduced subsequent food 
consumption (e.g. Houben, 2011; Houben & Jansen, 2011; Lawrence, Verbruggen, 
Adams, & Chambers, 2013; Veling, Aarts, & Papies, 2011; Veling, Aarts, & Stroebe, 
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2012). Furthermore, a similar procedure with alcohol-related stimuli reduced alcohol-
intake in the laboratory (Jones & Field, 2013) and even self-reported weekly alcohol 
intake of heavy drinking students (Houben, Havermans, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 2012; 
but see Jones & Field, 2013). These effects could be mediated by devaluation of the 
stimuli that were associated with stopping (e.g. Houben et al, 2012; Kiss, Raymond, 
Westoby, Nobre, Eimer, 2008; Veling, Holland, and van Knippenberg, 2008). Ferrey, 
Frischen, and Fenske (2012) showed that stop associations not only impact on the 
hedonic value of the stimuli associated with stopping but also on their behavioral 
incentive. They paired sexually attractive images with either going or stopping in a 
training phase, and then asked subjects to rate the attractiveness of the images. They 
found that the nogo (stop) images were rated less positively than the go images. This 
is similar to the findings of Raymond et al., who showed that ignoring a distractor 
leads to its devaluation. In a second study, Ferrey et al showed that subjects were less 
willing to work to see the erotic images that were paired with stopping. Thus, 
conditioned inhibitory control may impact on the motivational value of stimuli, 
perhaps via creating links between the stimuli and the appetitive/aversive centres 
postulated by Dickinson and Dearing (1979).  
 
Central to the ‘conditioned inhibitory control’ idea is the notion that the retrieval of 
stop representations will impair responding. However, such impairments could arise 
in at least two different processing stages: action selection and action execution3. First, 
in go/no-go and stop-signal tasks, subjects must select an action on each trial (Gomez, 
Ratcliff, Perea, 2007; Logan et al., 2014). The retrieval of stop information could 
interfere with selecting the appropriate ‘go’ action. This would be akin to ‘central’ 
interference between two competing go responses when selecting a response. This 
also implies that conditioned inhibitory control could be achieved via lateral local 
inhibitory connections between competing action options. This interference or conflict 
account receives some support from short-term aftereffect studies which demonstrated 
that stopping on the previous trial affected the stimulus-locked parietal P300, but only 
when the stimulus was repeated (Oldenburg et al., 2012). Response-locked motor 
components were not influenced, arguing against a motor locus for the effect (see also 
Enticott et al., 2009). Second, the retrieval of the stimulus-stop association could 
serve as a conditioned stop ‘signal’, activating the indirect or hyperdirect pathways 
that suppress motor output. This would be more similar to the direct, unconditional, 
automatic activation of an incorrect go response in interference tasks. Consistent with 
the motor suppression idea, Chiu, Aron, and Verbruggen (2012) showed that motor 
excitability was suppressed a mere 100 ms after the presentation of stimuli that were 
previously associated with stopping, but now required going. Of course, the two 
options are not exclusive. They may even rely on overlapping neural structures. The 
detection of conflict (defined as the competition between response options) could 
trigger a braking mechanism via the No-go cells of the indirect pathway or the 
hyperdirect pathway (see above; Frank, 2006; Ratcliff & Frank, 2012). If conflict 
between go and stop representations is detected early enough then this braking 
mechanism could account for the reduced motor excitability observed in Chiu et al. 
(2012). Thus, the main difference between the ‘automatic suppression’ account and 
the ‘conflict’ account is the trigger of the braking or stopping mechanism: the 
stimulus itself or the conflict caused by the retrieved information, respectively. Future 
                                                
3 In Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens, and McLaren (2014), we discuss a third 
possibility, namely that attention and signal detection become conditioned. 
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work is required to determine how exactly stop representations influence responding 
in various situations.  
 
In combination, the work above suggests that inhibitory control can be conditioned or 
become ‘automatized’. Dickinson and Dearing (1979) made a strong case for 
motivational influences and an appetitive-aversive interaction in Pavlovian 
conditioning. The work on conditioned inhibitory control suggests that very similar 
mechanisms might operate in instrumental inhibitory conditioning, despite the fact 
that Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning differ in many other ways (c.f. 
Dickinson & Balleine, 2002). In the next section, we will focus on integrating these 
findings and develop a theory of how ‘conditioned’ or ‘automatic’ inhibition might 
operate. 
 
Integration: Inhibition and Association 
 
Here we ask if it is possible to bring these two very different areas (animal 
conditioning and human cognitive psychology) together and arrive at a unified 
treatment of "inhibition" that would make sense in both domains. Our (somewhat 
tentative) answer is that it may be possible to develop an integrated approach that 
captures an emerging consensus in the two separate areas. This consensus revolves 
more around the associative structures that need to be posited to capture the notion of 
inhibition than the particular learning algorithms needed to operate within those 
structures, and so our treatment will mostly focus on the general architecture of 
inhibition at this point rather than exactly how it develops within this architecture 
(though the two issues are clearly not independent of one another). 
 
To recap, the work reviewed in Part I (‘Conditioned Inhibition’) suggests that there is 
a general form of inhibition mediated via excitatory connections to appetitive/aversive 
centres that mutually inhibit one another, and a more specific form of inhibition that is 
equivalent to a direct inhibitory link to the stimulus representation (be it CS or US) in 
question. Both will contribute to learning, and task contexts might determine the 
relative contribution of the two. The work reviewed in Part II (‘Conditioned 
Inhibitory Control’) suggests that inhibition of responses is an integral part of 
executive control, but in many situations, this top-down response inhibition can 
become ‘automatized’. Recent work suggests that subjects learn a general form of 
response inhibition, which transfers between tasks. This could be mediated by the 
same excitatory connections to the appetitive and aversive centres that are a key 
component of Pavlovian conditioning. Indeed, learning to stop or not to respond to a 
certain stimulus not only slows responding to it (e.g. Lenartowizc et al, 2011; Neill et 
al, 1992; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b) but also reduces its hedonic value and 
motivational incentive (e.g. Ferrey et al., 2012; Houben et al, 2012; Kiss et al, 2008; 
Raymond et al, 2003; Veling et al, 2008). Our interpretation of this is that when a 
distractor or no-go/stop stimulus becomes associated with an avoidance/aversive 
centre, then presentation of it will directly activate the avoidance/aversive centre, 
which in turn will suppress activation of the approach/appetitive centre (cf. Dickinson 
& Balleine, 2002). This could explain both the slower responding in a RT task and the 




Figure 3: A model integrating associative and motivational sub-systems that would 
enable implementation of our proposals for conditioned inhibition. The associative 
system contains both an auto-associative network and recurrence giving it the ability 
to capture statistical regularities in the environment and between actions and 
outcomes. The motivational and response systems are a synthesis of Dickinson and 
Balleine's (2002) implementation of Konorski's proposal with an instrumental 
Stop/Go system along the lines proposed by Boucher et al (2007). "Direct" 
conditioned inhibition takes place within the associative system, and is outcome 
specific. "General" conditioned inhibition takes place via links from the associative 
system to the other systems either at the Stop/Go instrumental level or the 
Appetitive/Aversive Pavlovian level. 
 
In a sense, then, we are arguing that "Go" and "Stop" are the instrumental equivalents 
of the Pavlovian "Good" and "Bad", and a scheme that implements this idea is shown 
in outline in Figure 3. Of course, Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning should not 
be equated entirely, as they appear to be influenced in different ways by 
manipulations of contexts, omission schedules (Dickinson & Balleine, 2002), and 
they are supported by different corticostriatal loops (for a short review, see Guitart-
Masip, Duzel, Dolan, Dayan, 2014). Nevertheless, recent work suggests that 
Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning interact in a go/no-go task (Guitart-Masip et 
al, 2014). For example, in a study by Guitart-Masip et al. (2012), subjects had to learn 
stimulus-go/no-go contingencies. They learned them faster when correct go responses 
were rewarded and incorrect no-go responses were punished, than the other way 
around. This was attributed to a hard-wired Pavlovian equivalence between 
reward/punishment and approach/avoidance, respectively. The Konorskian model, as 
discussed in Dickinson & Balleine (2002), also links the aversive system with 
avoidance (withdrawal, suppression) and the appetitive system with approach (go). 
Therefore, it seems plausible to suggest that when subjects always have to stop their 
response to a specific stimulus, a link between this stimulus and the 














Despite the seemingly overwhelming evidence for a strong link between go and 
appetite/reward and between no-go and aversion/punishment, a few findings appear 
inconsistent with the no-go/aversion account. For example, some studies have shown 
that response inhibition might be impaired rather than enhanced when negative 
emotional or threatening stimuli are presented (e.g. De Houwer & Tibboel, 2010; 
Pessoa, Padmala, Kenzer, & Bauer, 2012; Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007). Because 
these studies showed similar impairments when positive stimuli were presented, the 
effect of emotional and threatening stimuli has been attributed to arousal (rather than 
valence): arousing stimuli tend to attract attention (and are processed centrally when 
they high in threat), causing ‘dual-task’ interference. In other words, effects of arousal 
(attention) may have counteracted or dominated the effects of valence 
(positive/negative). Perhaps this is not very surprising given recent work that suggests 
that most of the stopping latency is occupied by afferent or sensory processes 
(Boucher et al., 2007; Salinas & Stanford, 2013); in other words, activation of the 
avoidance/aversive centre may only have a small influence on the overall SSRT, 
compared with the effect of arousal, because of the different time courses for the 
processes involved. In the study by Pessoa et al (2012, Experiment 2) in particular, 
the latency for activation of any aversive centre due to associations between the 
stimulus and some motivationally significant outcome may have been too long for it 
to have much effect on stopping in the stop-signal task, making any effect entirely 
dependent on a more cognitive appraisal of the stimulus.  
 
So far, we have focused mostly on the link between conditioned inhibitory control and 
appetitive/aversive valence. But our discussion of the conditioned inhibition literature 
suggests that performance cannot be explained using a single inhibitory mechanism. 
Apart from the direct link between the CS and the appetitive/aversive centres, there is 
the more specific link between the CS and US (or another CS). In the case of 
conditioned inhibition, this link will be inhibitory. Of course, in many other situations, 
this link will be excitatory (as in the original work of Pavlov). It seems likely that in 
the context of conditioned inhibitory control, subjects can also learn associations 
between the representation of the go stimulus and the representation of the stop signal 
(Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014). Factors such as the number and kind of stop or no-go 
signals could determine the relative contribution of stimulus-stimulus associations vs. 
stimulus-approach/avoidance associations.  
 
Conclusion: Inhibition in Cognitive Control and Associative Learning  
 
We have tried to provide a modern approach to the problem of inhibition that draws 
on many of the classic studies in the animal learning tradition that exemplify the 
contribution that experimental psychology can make to current issues in cognitive 
neuroscience. We hope that this integration of the old and the new will prove fruitful 
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